Decision-Theoretic Pluralism by Bales, Adam
Decision-Theoretic Pluralism
Causation, Evidence, and Indeterminacy∗
Adam Bales
Abstract
A prominent philosophical debate concerns whether we should accept
causal decision theory (CDT) or evidential decision theory (EDT) as
our best theory of rational choice. However, instead of accepting one
of these theories at the expense of the other, an alternative would be
to accept that both theories play a partial role in the true account of
rational choice. In this paper, I defend a pluralist account of this sort.
In particular, I argue that rational permissibility is an indeterminate
notion, with EDT and CDT each corresponding to one sharpening of
this notion.
7,500 words
We’re doing rational choice theory wrong. This is the claim that I will
defend in this paper. We’re doing rational choice theory wrong and if we do
it right then we can irenically resolve some long-standing disagreements.
My interest in this paper will be in the decision-theoretic debate that
was kickstarted when Nozick (1969) introduced Newcomb’s Problem: the de-
bate pitting causal decision theory (CDT) against evidential decision theory
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(EDT).1 Nozick himself came to think that both the causal and evidential
perspectives captured elements of the truth about rationality. On the other
hand, philosophical orthodoxy holds that at most one of these perspectives
is right (and much discussion has concerned which should be abandoned and
which retained).
In the first half of this paper, I argue that the existing literature already
gives us strong grounds to reject philosophical orthodoxy and accept Noz-
ick’s claim that both perspectives capture part of the truth about rationality.
In the second half of the paper, I then make this claim precise. In particular,
I argue that it is sometimes an indeterminate matter whether a decision is
rationally permissible, with the evidential and the causal perspectives corre-
sponding to different sharpenings of this indeterminate concept. This result
irenically resolves the decision-theoretic debate.
1 Two perspectives on rationality
The jumping-off point for this paper is Newcomb’s Problem:2
An agent faces two boxes, one transparent (which contains $1000)
and one opaque (which is either empty or contains $1,000,000).
The agent may either take both boxes (two-box) or just the
opaque box (one-box). However, the opaque box was filled yes-
terday based on a perfect prediction of the agent’s behaviour,
such that $1,000,000 was placed in the opaque box if the agent
was predicted to one-box (otherwise the box was left empty).
1CDT and EDT aren’t the only two positions in the debate but I focus on these theories
here.
2In all cases discussed in this paper, it should be assumed that the agent believes that
the case has the features described.
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Newcomb’s Problem highlights the distinction between two perspectives
on rational choice: a causal perspective and an evidential perspective.
To get to the causal perspective, consider an argument for two-boxing:
(1) the agent can’t causally influence the contents of the opaque box, as
this box is already filled and the case is stipulated to involve no backwards
causation; (2) however this box is filled, the agent ends up $1000 richer if she
two-boxes than if she one-boxes (as she will inevitably get the opaque box’s
contents but will also get $1000 from the transparent box if she two-boxes);
and therefore (3) the agent should two-box.
This argument suggests a causal perspective on rationality, on which
what an agent ought to do depends centrally on her beliefs about what she
can and cannot causally influence (after all, this argument appeals to the
fact that the agent can’t causally influence the opaque box’s contents). This
causal perspective is normally spelled out in the form of causal decision
theory (CDT), which in informal terms holds that a decision is rationally
permissible if its expected causal effects are at least as good as the expected
causal effects of any other decision. CDT endorses two-boxing in Newcomb’s
Problem, as this causes the agent to gain the contents of both boxes, rather
than causing her to gain the contents of just the opaque box.
These same points can be made more formally (as CDT is, after all, a
formal theory). Now, in more formal terms, CDT entails that a decision is
rationally permissible if it maximises causal expected utility (CEU), where
the CEU of a decision, D, is defined as follows:
CEU (D) =
∑
S
Cr(S\D)U(S ∧D)
Here, S ranges across a set of world states (that is, possibly ways that
the world might be). U is then a utility function, which assigns a real-
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number utility value to an outcome (that is, the conjunction of a state
and a decision). This number represents how desirable the agent finds each
outcome, such that a higher number represents a more desirable outcome.
Finally, Cr(S\D) is a credence function that assigns credences (that is,
subjective probabilities) to a state S after accounting for the causal influence
of D. There is some disagreement about how precisely this should be spelled
out.3 However, the basic idea is that this credence will be high if the agent
either thinks that D causes S to be likely to hold or thinks that S is likely
to hold regardless of the agent’s decision.4 So CDT labels a decision as
permissible if it maximises a causal-credence-weighted sum of utilities.
Now we can apply this theory to Newcomb’s Problem. First, let E repre-
sent the opaque box being empty and M represent the opaque box contain-
ing $1,000,000. Then let T represent the agent two-boxing and O represent
her one-boxing. Now, because the agent’s behaviour does not causally in-
fluence the box contents Cr(E\T ) = Cr(E\O) = Cr(E) and Cr(M\T ) =
Cr(M\O) = Cr(M). Assuming for simplicity that the utility of outcomes
is equal to the monetary value of these outcomes, we can now calculate the
CEU of each decision as follows:
CEU (T ) = Cr(E\T )U(E ∧ T ) + Cr(M\T )U(M ∧ T )
= Cr(E) ∗ 1000 + Cr(M) ∗ 1, 001, 000
3Indeed, CDT is often formalised in counterfactual (rather than causal) terms but this
distinction is unimportant for my purposes.
4For more details about this credence, see Joyce 1999: 161–180.
4
CEU (O) = Cr(E\O)U(E ∧O) + Cr(M\O)U(M ∧O)
= Cr(E) ∗ 0 + Cr(M) ∗ 1, 000, 000
= CEU (T )− 1000
As the CEU of two-boxing (T) is higher than the CEU of one-boxing
(O), it follows that CDT will endorse the permissibility of just two-boxing.
So CDT, the causal perspective on rationality, endorses two-boxing.
Now we can turn to the evidential perspective on rationality. To reach
this, consider an argument for one-boxing: (1) if the agent two-boxes then
she will have been predicted to two-box and so the opaque box will be empty
(and so the agent will end up with just the $1000 from the transparent box);
(2) if the agent one-boxes then she will have been predicted to one-box and
so the opaque box will contain $1,000,000 (and so the agent will end up with
$1,000,000); (3) $1,000,000 is more than $1000; and therefore (4) the agent
should one-box.
This argument can lead to an evidential perspective on rationality, which
is typically spelled out in the form of evidential decision theory (EDT). In
informal terms this theory holds that a decision is rationally permissible
if it provides the agent with evidence that is at least as desirable as the
evidence that any other decision would provide. EDT sides with the above
argument and endorses one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem, as one-boxing
provides the desirable evidence that the agent was predicted to one-box and
hence that the opaque box contains $1,000,000, whereas two-boxing provides
the undesirable evidence that this box is empty.
Again, this point can be made formally. In particular, EDT labels a
decision as permissible if it maximises evidential expected utility (EEU).
The EEU of a decision is calculated in the same way as its CEU, except
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that Cr(S\D) is replaced with the conditional credence Cr(S | D), which
we can think of as capturing the evidence that D provides about S. So we
calculate the EEU of a decision, D, as follows:
EEU (D) =
∑
S
Cr(S | D)U(S ∧D)
So EDT takes a decision to be permissible if it maximises a conditional-
credence-weighted sum of utilities.
Now, because of the predictor’s perfect accuracy, Cr(M | O) = Cr(E |
T ) = 1 and Cr(E | O) = Cr(M | T ) = 0. We can now calculate the EEU of
the decisions in Newcomb’s Problem as follows:
EEU (T ) = Cr(E | T )U(E ∧ T ) + Cr(M | T )U(M ∧ T )
= 1000
EEU (O) = Cr(E | O)U(E ∧O) + Cr(M | O)U(M ∧O)
= 1, 000, 000
As the EEU of one-boxing exceeds the EEU of two-boxing, EDT will
endorse one-boxing. So according to EDT, the evidential perspective, one
ought one-box in Newcomb’s Problem. We have two perspectives on ratio-
nality and these perspectives part way on Newcomb’s Problem.
2 Perspectival Pluralism
In the decades since Nozick introduced Newcomb’s Problem to the philo-
sophical community, there has been an ongoing debate about which of these
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perspectives is correct. However, Nozick (1993: 45) has spoken out against
the assumption, tacit in this debate, that at least one of these perspectives
must be rejected outright:
I suggest that we... say not merely that we are uncertain about
which one of these two [perspectives] is (all by itself) correct, but
that both of these [perspectives] are legitimate and each must be
given its respective due.
Call this broad approach pluralism. That is, according to pluralism there
are either: (a) unified norms of rational permissibility simpliciter, such that
these norms refer to considerations from both the causal and evidential
perspectives; or (b) distinct norms of causal rationality and evidential ra-
tionality (which are captured by the causal and evidential perspectives in
turn).5 An example of the first type of pluralism would be Nozick’s own
view, according to which a decision is permissible if it maximises a weighted
sum of the CEU and the EEU. There is a clear sense in which this view
takes permissibility to depend both on considerations captured by the causal
perspective (the CEU) and considerations captured by the evidential per-
spective (the EEU). An example of the second type of pluralism would then
be the view discussed in Horgan 1985: Horgan suggests that perhaps causal
and evidential rationality are simply distinct normative domains and are not
competing attempts to capture truths about the same normative domain.
Setting aside, for now, the distinction between these two types of ac-
counts, one motivation for pluralism follows from the fact that both the ar-
gument for two-boxing and that for one-boxing are compelling; this is what
5Here I talk about rational permissibility rather than requirement. In doing so, I follow
the treatment of indeterminacy and choice in various other discussions (cf. Dougherty
2014 and Rinard 2015). In any case, given that an agent is required to φ just if they are
permitted to φ and not permitted to ¬φ, the discussion could easily be adapted so as to
comment on what an agent is required to do.
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makes Newcomb’s Problem puzzling. One possible response to this fact is to
accept pluralism: that is, accept that the two perspectives that follow from
these arguments both play a role in an adequate account of rationality.6
Nor is Newcomb’s Problem the only case that supports pluralism. For
example, consider the Psychopath Button (from Egan 2007):
Paul is faced with a button that, if pressed, will kill all of the
psychopaths in the world. Paul must now choose between two
options: he can either press the button or he can refrain from
doing so. Now Paul strongly desires to live but he has a weak
desire to rid the world of psychopaths. Further, while Paul is
almost certain that he isn’t a psychopath, he thinks that only
a psychopath would be likely to press the button. Should Paul
press the button?
As with Newcomb’s Problem, there are two arguments here, to contra-
dictory conclusions.
Egan points to one of these. In particular, Paul thinks that only a psy-
chopath is likely to press the button and so thinks that if he himself presses
the button, he is almost certainly a psychopath. If Paul is a psychopath and
presses the button then he will cause his own death. Consequently, if Paul
presses the button then he will come to think that he has almost certainly
caused his own death. Under such circumstances, Paul should not press the
button when he has the risk-free option of refraining from pressing.
The evidential perspective is responsive to this argument. After all, if
Paul presses then this provides evidence that he’s a psychopath and so evi-
6Both sides of the debate have responses to the argument that they reject (cf. Joyce
1999: 151–154; Ahmed 2014: 195–199). However, insofar as the arguments are intuitively
plausible, one might reject the responses rather than the original argument. It is surprising
that more people haven’t chosen tollens over ponens here.
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dence that he will die. On the other hand, if Paul refrains from pressing, this
provides evidence that no-one will die and so that Paul himself will survive.
As the second lot of evidence is more welcome for the agent than the first,
the evidential perspective will endorse refraining from pressing.7
Now, while many people find the argument for refraining compelling,
some do not. Further, there is in fact another argument available here. After
all, Paul is almost certain that he isn’t a psychopath. If Paul isn’t a psy-
chopath then he receives his most desired outcome by pressing the button
and receives a less desired outcome if he refrains from pressing the button.
So Paul is rationally required to press the button.8
The causal perspective is responsive to this argument. After all, Paul is
almost certain that he’s not a psychopath and so almost certain that pressing
will cause all psychopaths to die but will not cause his own death. On the
other hand, refraining will not cause any deaths. Insofar as Paul wants to
kill all psychopaths, the expected causal impact of pressing is then better
than the expected causal impact of not pressing. Consequently, the causal
perspective will label pressing as rationally required.9
So, as in Newcomb’s Problem, in the Psychopath Button there are com-
pelling arguments to contradictory conclusions. Then, once again, a natural
response is to accept that both the causal and the evidential perspectives
play a role in an adequate account of rational choice. After all, the evidential
perspective is responsive to one of the plausible arguments in the Psychopath
Button and the causal perspective is responsive to the other. Given this, we
can make sense of both arguments by accepting that both perspectives play
7More formally, this result follows from EDT because Cr(Psychopath | Press) is high.
8It is stipulated in the Psychopath Button that an appropriately small risk of death can
be outweighed by the higher chance of successfully killing all psychopaths. More formally,
this result follows from CDT because Cr(Psychopath\Press) = Cr(Psychopath) and, as
specified, this credence is low.
9For a more formal discussion, see Egan 2007: 99–100.
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a role in our best account of rational choice and so can make sense of both
of these arguments by accepting pluralism (further, I will argue in §5 that
pluralism can also account for why the first of the above arguments might
strike us as more compelling than the second). So, along with Newcomb’s
Problem, the Psychopath Button supports pluralism. Consequently, we have
two initial reasons to accept pluralism. In the remainder of the paper, I will
discuss further reasons to do so, in the course of discussing a particular form
of pluralism: indeterminacy pluralism.
3 Indeterminate Rationality
Pluralism can come in many flavours. This raises the question of which form
of pluralism we should accept. Well, here it’s natural to start with Nozick,
my paradigm pluralist, whose account I outlined earlier. According to this
account, a decision is permissible if it maximises a weighted sum of the
CEU and EEU. Now the full details of this account will not matter for my
purposes. Here’s what does matter: Nozick accepts a view on which there
are unified, overarching norms of rationality. Nozick’s view is then pluralist
insofar as he holds that these unified norms make reference to considerations
from both the causal and the evidential perspectives. This is the first of the
two types of pluralism that I mentioned earlier.
However, assuming that we are motivated to accept pluralism in part by
reflection on Newcomb’s Problem and the Psychopath Button, this sort of
hybrid view is problematic. After all, we can now ask what the overarching
norms of rational permissibility simpliciter entail about rational permissibil-
ity in any particular version of these cases. Take Newcomb’s Problem. Here
there are three options. First, these norms might entail the permissibility
of just two-boxing. However, the view then fails to be appropriately re-
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sponsive to the earlier argument for one-boxing. Second, these norms might
entail the permissibility of just one-boxing. However, the view then fails to
be appropriately responsive to the earlier argument for two-boxing. Third,
the norms might entail the permissibility of both decisions. However, the
view then fails to be appropriately responsive to either the argument for
one-boxing or the argument for two-boxing. After all, these arguments es-
tablish not just that one decision is rational but also that the other is not.
Given this, taking both decisions to be permissible is in conflict with both
arguments. Consequently, any account that spells out pluralism in terms of
unified, overarching norms of rationality will struggle to account for both
arguments in Newcomb’s Problem. Assuming that accounting for these is
one of our motivations for accepting pluralism, we have grounds to reject
such a version of pluralism.10
It is time to turn, then, to an alternative type of pluralism. To get to
such a view, I start with a comment made by Horgan (1985: 229):
[The stalemate over Newcomb’s Problem] is frustrating...because
it suggests the disturbing possibility that there is really no such
thing as the rational act simpliciter but only the [evidentially-
rational] act and the [causally-rational] act.
In other words, Horgan is a pluralist not in the sense that he takes the
causal and evidential perspectives to both play a role in norms of rational
permissibility simpliciter but in the sense that he accepts the existence of
distinct norms of causal rationality and norms of evidential rationality.11
10One rejoinder: perhaps one-boxing is required in just some versions of Newcomb’s
Problem and two-boxing is required in others. Perhaps the force of the above arguments
then results because they imperfectly mimic more nuanced, true arguments. Still, absent
a substantial argument for this claim, it is reasonable to set this form of pluralism aside.
11Outright rejection of the existence of rational permissibility simpliciter is the most
extreme form of this view. A more moderate view would accept that there are norms of
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This was the second type of pluralism that I mentioned above.
This raises a further question: if there are merely norms of causal ra-
tionality and of evidential rationality then what should we say about talk
of rational permissibility simpliciter? Here’s an attractive view: our concept
of rational permissibility admits of indeterminacy, with the evidential per-
spective (EDT) corresponding to one sharpening of this concept and the
causal perspective (CDT) corresponding to another.12 Now, the full details
of this view will depend on the account of indeterminacy adopted. How-
ever, for concreteness I will focus here on the view that we are led to if we
adopt supervaluationism regarding indeterminacy.13 Consequently, on the
view under consideration: (a) a decision is rationally permissible simpliciter
if and only if it is rationally permissible from both the causal and evidential
perspectives (that is, according to both CDT and EDT); (b) a decision is
rationally impermissible simpliciter if and only if it is rationally impermissi-
ble on both the causal and evidential perspectives (again, according to both
EDT and CDT); and (c) a decision is indeterminately permissible if and
only if it is permissible on one perspective and impermissible on the other
(so if it is permissible according to one of EDT and CDT and impermissible
according to the other).14 In the remainder of this paper, I will argue for
rational permissibility simpliciter but that they fall silent in a small number of cases. In
these cases, the overall notion will not apply and instead we can apply only the notions
of the evidentially and the causally rational.
12Here, I assume that we do have a single concept of (instrumental) rational permis-
sibility. This claim strikes me as intuitively plausible. Further, proponents of EDT and
CDT do typically take it that they are attempting to provide an account of the same sort
of means-end rationality. Then, on top of all of this, EDT and CDT come apart only in
strange cases that were not encountered in the development of our concepts. As such, it is
unlikely that we will have distinct concepts to pick out these two classes of norms (given
that they overlap in the cases that shaped our conceptual world).
13I will assume that indeterminacy occurs at the semantic level rather than in the world
itself. Alternatives to supervaluationism include epistemicism and subvaluationism and
which account one adopts here will likely depend on their broader views about indetermi-
nacy. I find supervaluationism generally plausible and so focus on this account here.
14Might there be other sharpenings of permissibility? I return to this question later.
However, I note that if indeterminacy pluralism is to be plausible then any other sharpen-
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this indeterminacy pluralism.15
4 Four Arguments
In order to do so, I will provide four arguments for this view.
4.1 Indeterminacy Worries
As a starting point, then, I note that some people might be suspicious from
the get go about the idea of indeterminate permissibility.16 Consequently,
it’s worth starting out by deflating this suspicion.
In order to do so, I note that there are various reasons, independent
of the considerations in this paper, to take the possibility of indeterminate
permissibility seriously. For example, Williams (2014; 2016) has argued that
there are some cases where it is indeterminate whether we will receive the
things that we care about (perhaps because it is indeterminate whether we
will be the person that receives these things) and has suggested that indeter-
minate permissibility might arise in such cases. Similarly, Rinard (2015) has
suggested that cases involving imprecise credences are cases where a person
has indeterminate beliefs and has suggested that indeterminate permissibil-
ings will need to coincidence with EDT and CDT in everyday cases, where it is implausible
to declare that some decision is indeterminately permissible. Why think that this will turn
out to be the case? The basic idea, which I will discuss further in §4.2, is that reflection on
the factors that shape our concepts suggests that indeterminacy will only arise in strange
cases here.
15Alternatively, perhaps “rational permissibility” is ambiguous. Despite some apparent
differences, I think there is little to separate the ambiguity and indeterminacy views, so
discuss indeterminacy for concreteness but remain open to both views.
16It might be worried that an evaluation of a decision as indeterminately permissible
cannot guide us. However, it’s not clear that this is true (cf. Williams 2014). Further, even
if it is, the indeterminacy theory can guide us when decisions are determinately permissible
and can play useful non-guidance roles (like providing insight into the normative world).
Another concern: does permissibility lacks the features of paradigm examples of vague-
ness (like baldness and redness)? Perhaps but it is similar to another such case: the vague-
ness of counterfactual dependence. Further, indeterminacy extends beyond vagueness (see
Williams 2012) and so indeterminacy pluralism need not be about vagueness at all.
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ity naturally arises here. Finally, Schoenfield (2015) and Dougherty (2014),
among others, have suggested that moral permissibility can be indetermi-
nate. For example, Dougherty considers that it might be morally permissible
to save your friend rather than, say, two strangers, morally impermissible
to save your friend rather than, say, 1000 strangers and has suggested that
there might be some number of strangers in between where it is indetermi-
nately permissible to save your friend rather than the strangers. In the light
of this, it is plausible that rational permissibility too might sometimes be
indeterminate.
We already have good reasons, then, to think that rational permissibility
can be indeterminate. Consequently, the mere fact that the theory under
consideration involves indeterminate permissibility is no mark against it.17
4.2 Semantic Considerations
Following on from this, it’s worth saying something to motivate the specific
indeterminacy theory under discussion. Note, then, that indeterminacy plu-
ralism denies that there are any norms of rational permissibility simpliciter
(or, at least, denies that these norms must always give unequivocal guid-
ance). What this theory explains, then, is our talk of such permissibility.
Consequently, the sort of indeterminacy under discussion here is semantic
indeterminacy, where such indeterminacy arises when the conventions that
govern our language don’t settle some case.
Now, as noted in Horwich 1985, these conventions evolve so as to be use-
ful in our actual environment and so it’s entirely plausible that these con-
ventions will not settle strange cases like Newcomb’s Problem. Consequently,
Horwich notes, EDT and CDT (which agree in most everyday cases) will
17Nor does the literature on indeterminate permissibility undermine the novelty of the
current discussion (which outlines a new source of indeterminacy of permissibility).
14
plausibly do an equally good job of capturing the settled conventions about
rational permissibility.18 As such, it is natural to think that permissibil-
ity might sometimes be indeterminate and that the evidential and causal
perspectives might correspond to different ways of resolving this indetermi-
nacy. We have initial grounds, then, to be sympathetic to the indeterminacy
theory.
4.3 The Indeterminacy of Counterfactuals
More speculatively, it can be argued that the indeterminacy theory follows
from the indeterminacy of counterfactuals. In particular, which decisions
are permissible plausibly depends on what would be the case if each deci-
sion were made (that is, permissibility is connected to counterfactual reason-
ing).19 However, counterfactual dependence is indeterminate (cf. Lewis 1979:
457). Now if permissibility depends on what counterfactuals hold and this
is an indeterminate matter, then indeterminacy of permissibility naturally
arises.
Taking this argument slowly, start with Lewis’s (1973) account of coun-
terfactuals. In simplified terms, this account holds that a counterfactual is
true if its consequent holds in the possible world where the antecedent holds
that is most similar to the actual world. Now similarity is indeterminate:
one world might be more similar to the actual world in terms of its laws of
nature while another might be more similar in terms of its past history and
there doesn’t seem to be a determinate answer as to which of these worlds is
overall more similar to the actual world. Now, as similarity is indeterminate
18Horwich (1985) concurs but argues for extending our concept of permissibility in
accordance with EDT. The indeterminacy theorist stops one step earlier: as we’re already
committed to indeterminate permissibility elsewhere, there is little cost to stopping here.
19This view does not unfairly favour CDT (which can be formalised in counterfactual
terms) because EDT too can be construed in such a way (Horgan 1981: 343–347).
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and counterfactuals hold based on similarity considerations, it is at least
sometimes indeterminate whether a counterfactual holds.
Now, we can recognise the importance of counterfactuals to choice by
framing decision theory not in terms of conditional or causal credences but
in terms of counterfactual credences. So, on this view, decision theory ap-
peals to the agent’s credences that if she were to choose D, S would be the
case. A decision is then permissible if it maximises counterfactual expected
utility. Now this theory’s guidance depends on how we resolved the inde-
terminacy of counterfactual dependence: different guidance will result from
different resolutions. Consequently, if we don’t insist on using a single reso-
lution of this indeterminacy in decision theory, decisions will sometimes be
indeterminately permissible.
But will CDT and EDT correspond to sharpenings of permissibility, as
per indeterminacy pluralism? Well, they will if each results from counter-
factual decision theory by resolving counterfactual indeterminacy in some
manner. And indeed, CDT is often presented as counterfactual decision
theory, with a non-backtracking resolution of counterfactual indeterminacy
(roughly, a resolution that insists on sameness of past).20 Further, per Hor-
gan (1981: 345–347), EDT too can be construed in this manner, but with a
conditionalised resolution of indeterminacy. So CDT and EDT will naturally
correspond to sharpenings of the indeterminate notion of permissibility.
Still, this hardly provides a watertight argument for indeterminacy plu-
ralism. After all, while counterfactuals plausibly play a role in rational
choice, it could be insisted that we must resolve all counterfactual inde-
terminacy to make sense of this role. If so, indeterminate permissibility will
not arise.21 So if it doesn’t provide a watertight argument, what does the
20I set aside here a complication involving chancy cases. See Lewis 1981.
21Alternatively, someone could adopt the extreme position that all resolutions of coun-
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above discussion establish? It establishes a natural way that indeterminate
permissibility can arise and shows how we can formalise indeterminacy plu-
ralism. This is far from a decisive argument for the view. Nevertheless, it
complements the other arguments discussed.
4.4 Resolving the Problem Cases
Finally, the plausibility of indeterminacy pluralism is bolstered by the fact
that this theory can make sense of both of the scenarios discussed in the pre-
vious section. The solution in both cases will be basically the same. After all,
in Newcomb’s Problem the intuitions and arguments favouring one-boxing
and two-boxing are both taken seriously by indeterminacy pluralism because
each intuition and associated argument gets things right on one sharpening
of the notion of rational permissibility. Then we can make the same move in
relation to the Psychopath Button: the intuition favouring pressing is cap-
tured by one sharpening of permissibility and the intuition favour refraining
is captured by another. Consequently, indeterminacy pluralism can make
sense of both Newcomb’s Problem and the Psychopath Button. There are
four reasons, then, to accepting indeterminacy pluralism.
5 Psychopaths and Context
Still, at this point a problem arises for indeterminacy pluralism. After all,
many people find the argument for refraining in the Psychopath Button far
more compelling than the argument for pressing the button in this scenario.
Consequently, these people conclude that an agent is straightforwardly re-
terfactual indeterminacy play a role in rational choice. However, on such an account it is
likely that most decisions will be indeterminately permissible. As such, I take this account
to be implausible given the view, in §4.2, of the sort of indeterminacy under discussion
here.
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quired to refrain from pressing the button here. This raises two challenges
to indeterminacy pluralism. First, this theory needs to be able to account
for why the argument for refraining has greater intuitive force than the ar-
gument for pressing, given that indeterminacy pluralism entails that each of
these arguments are right on one sharpening of permissibility. Second, the
proponent of this theory needs to be able to explain away the intuition that
refraining is straightforwardly rationally required, given that indeterminacy
pluralism instead entails that this decision is indeterminately permissible.22
Fortunately, a simple response to both challenges is available. In particu-
lar, it is plausible that contextual factors help determine which sharpenings
of permissibility are psychologically salient in some circumstance.23 Further,
if contextual factors make the evidential perspective more psychologically
salient than the causal perspective in the Psychopath Button then this would
explain why people tend to find the argument for refraining more compelling
than the argument for pressing and, as a result of this, would explain why
people (mistakenly) take refraining to be determinately rationally required.
What contextual factors might play the desired role? Well, for a start,
the stakes (that is, the difference in expected value between the two available
decisions) in the Psychopath Button are higher on the evidential perspective
than on the causal perspective (which is to say that there is a greater gap
between the EEU of pressing and of refraining than between the CEU of
pressing and of refraining). After all, on the evidential perspective pressing
is very bad, because pressing kills Paul. On the other hand, on the causal
perspective pressing is a far weaker good, as it is merely likely to rid the
22A number of philosophers deny the force of the intuition that refraining is rationally
required (cf. Arntzenius 2008; Joyce 2012). So one might well doubt that this objection is
as forceful as I have taken it to be.
23That is, I am arguing that context helps determine our intuitive judgements. An al-
ternative view: perhaps rational permissibility itself has contextual parameters that some-
times pick out just one sharpening.
18
world of psychopaths.24 So the stakes are higher on the evidential perspective
than on the causal perspective. Further, stakes are key contextual factors
that plausibly inform our intuitive judgements and so make the evidential
perspective psychologically more salient here.25 In addition to this, moral
consideration plausibly influence our intuitive judgements about rational-
ity.26 That is, we are plausibly more likely to judge a decision as rational
if it is moral and more likely to judge it as irrational if it is immoral. Now
insofar as pressing involves mass murder and so is morally bad, we’re likely
to be psychologically more responsive to arguments that label pressing as
irrational. Consequently, this factor too will make the evidential perspective
psychologically more compelling than the causal perspective in the case at
hand.
By reference to these factors, indeterminacy pluralism can account for
the greater intuitive force of the argument for refraining than the argu-
ment for pressing in the Psychopath Button: contextual factors are present
in the Psychopath Button that make the evidential perspective (and hence
the argument for refraining) more psychologically salient than the causal
perspective (and hence the argument for pressing). Consequently, not only
can indeterminacy pluralism capture the sense in which there are two com-
pelling arguments in the Psychopath Button but it can also make sense of
why one of these arguments exerts greater intuitive weight than the other.
24The case stipulates that Paul values survival over ridding the world of psychopaths.
25For evidence that stakes inform our decision-theoretic intuitions, see MacCrimmon
and Larsson (1979: 393) and Anand (1990). For previous discussions that have relied on
the assumption of such stake sensitivity, see Nozick 1993 and MacAskill 2016.
26For evidence that our intuitions generally (about, for example, causation and inten-
tionality) are influenced by moral factors see Knobe 2003; Knobe and Fraser 2008.
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6 The Smoker’s Challenge
So far, so good. Unfortunately, at this point a further problem for inde-
terminacy pluralism arises. To get to this, consider the Smoking Lesion, a
prominent example of what is often called a medical Newcomb’s Problem:27
Imagine that smoking does not itself increase a person’s cancer
risk but that smokers are nevertheless more likely to get cancer
than non-smokers are because of a brain lesion that both makes
a person more likely to smoke and more likely to develop cancer.
Cathy would strongly prefer not to develop cancer but enjoys
smoking. Should Cathy smoke?
In Newcomb’s Problem, there is significant disagreement about which
decision it would be rational to make. However, in the Smoking Lesion there
is almost unanimous agreement that Cathy ought to smoke. After all, she
enjoys smoking and smoking doesn’t increase her cancer risk. In the light
of this, Cathy may as well get the pleasure of smoking, given that doing so
doesn’t come with any disadvantage.
Now this decision is permissible from the causal perspective: smoking
doesn’t cause Cathy to be more likely to get cancer but it does cause her some
enjoyment and so smoking has a better causal impact than not smoking,
which doesn’t cause the same enjoyment.28 On the other hand, at least on
the face of it, not smoking is labelled as rationally required on the evidential
perspective: smoking provides Cathy with evidence that she has the lesion,
and so is more likely to get cancer, while not smoking provides Cathy with
evidence that she lacks the lesion, and so is less likely to get cancer. Not
27This case has been discussed for decades but my presentation follows Egan 2007.
28See Briggs (2010: 7–8) for formal details.
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smoking provides better evidence than smoking, so not smoking is rationally
required on the evidential perspective.29
As a consequence of this a problem arises. After all, not smoking appears
to be outright impermissible here but indeterminacy pluralism instead takes
this decision to be indeterminately permissible, as this decision is permissible
on one sharpening of permissibility (the evidential perspective) but not the
other (the causal perspective). Consequently, indeterminacy pluralism seems
to get this case wrong and so we have a challenge to this theory.
Here there are two possible responses. The first appeals to existing de-
fences of EDT, which attempt to show either that this theory does not
endorse smoking in the Smoking Lesion or that it endorses smoking only
in strange versions of the case where our intuitions are no longer reliable.
Such defences come in a number of forms but one of the simplest, and most
prominent, is the tickle defence (for a more detailed defence of EDT here,
see Ahmed 2014). According to the tickle defence, in realistic versions of the
Smoking Lesion, the lesion will influence Cathy’s decision by influencing her
beliefs or her desires (at least in versions of the case where Cathy can be said
to still be deciding freely). Further, it is argued that Cathy will typically be
able to detect this influence (that is, Cathy will feel some sort of tickle if
she has the lesion). If so, however, then she will already know whether or
not she has the smoking lesion, from reflection on whether or not she feels
the tickle. As such, smoking will not provide further evidence that she has
the lesion. Then, as deciding to smoke still provides her with evidence that
she will get the pleasure of smoking, this decision will now provide the most
desirable evidence. So the tickle defence concludes that EDT endorses the
29See Briggs (2010: 6–7) for formal details. Note that by pointing to the tickle defence
(cf. Eells 1981) it could be argued that EDT, and hence the evidential perspective, endorses
smoking. I am dubious that this defence truly succeeds but if it does then the challenge
to indeterminacy pluralism collapses immediately. So much the better!
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requirement to smoke in the Smoking Lesion.
Now, if one accepts this argument outright then the problem considered
in this section is resolved, as indeterminacy pluralism now labels smoking as
determinately permissible. Still, even if one doubts that the tickle defence
always does the desired job, it must be accepted that it often does. So, at
worst, the evidential perspective endorses not smoking only in versions of
the Smoking Lesion where tickles do not arise. Further, many such cases will
either be unrealistic or will involve Cathy’s free will being impinged upon.
Consequently, the indeterminacy pluralist can now bite the bullet at little
cost: they only need to accept the indeterminate permissibility of smoking
in a constrained class of cases, many of which will be unrealistic.
Still, another response is also available. After all, a second option would
be to reject the claim that the evidential perspective corresponds to a sharp-
ening of the indeterminate notion of permissibility and instead accept a ver-
sion of indeterminacy pluralism on which one sharpening corresponds to the
causal perspective and another sharpening corresponds to some distinct per-
spective (that is, a perspective that is neither the causal nor the evidential
perspective).
For example, perhaps a second sharpening is captured by a theory along
the lines of Spohn 2012 and Easwaran MS. Glossing over the details, these
theories are variants on CDT that focus not on the causal impact of the
agent’s decisions but rather on the causal impact of the agent’s dispositions
to decide. So according to this version of indeterminacy pluralism, what is
indeterminate is not how we should evaluate decisions but rather what it is
that decision theory should be evaluating (decisions or dispositions).
The disposition theory will endorse one-boxing in versions of Newcomb’s
Problem where the prediction of the agent’s behaviour is made based on
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the agent’s psychological dispositions. As such, the latest version of inde-
terminacy pluralism continues to deliver the result that one and two-boxing
are indeterminately permissible in many versions of Newcomb’s Problem.
However, the disposition theory labels smoking as required in the Smoking
Lesion, as being disposed to smoke leaves the agent best off, regardless of
whether or not she has the lesion. So the latest version of the indetermi-
nacy theory avoids the challenge of the Smoking Lesion. As such, moving to
this version of the indeterminacy theory presents a second potential line of
response here.30
I conclude that not only do the four arguments above support indeter-
minacy pluralism but that this theory can survive objections based on the
Psychopath Button and the Smoking Lesion. Indeterminacy pluralism is a
promising theory of choice.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I have defended three main claims. First, we should accept
pluralism. That is, we should accept that both the causal and evidential
perspectives play a role in an adequate account of rational choice. Second,
we should accept indeterminacy pluralism. That is, we should spell out plu-
ralism by accepting that our concept of rational permissibility admits of
indeterminacy and that the evidential and causal perspectives correspond
to different sharpenings of this concept. Finally, we should supplement inde-
terminacy pluralism by an appeal to the context-sensitivity of our intuitions,
to explain why our intuitions sometimes hew particularly close to either the
causal or evidential perspective.
30This account will plausibly not deliver the desired result in the Psychopath Button.
So there is more work to be done to make this account fully adequate.
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Further, as well as establishing these three claims, the discussion in this
paper provides a lens through which the broader debate over Newcomb’s
Problem can be viewed. In particular, this debate once focused almost ex-
clusively on EDT and CDT but recent years have seen an explosion in the
number of interesting decision-theoretic views being defended. For exam-
ple, Wedgewood (2011), MacAskill (2016) and Spencer and Wells (MS) all
present hybrid pluralist versions of decision theory. Meanwhile, Price (2012)
defends a view on which CDT and EDT turn out to be one and the same
theory, when appropriately construed. Finally, Briggs (2010) has developed
an impossibility proof, which uses both causal and evidential principles to
attempt to demonstrate that no adequate theory of rational choice can be
developed.
At the moment, all of these results, and a number of others, have been
presented as disparate competitors and, as a result, the decision theoretic
debate has lost the clarity it once had, with possible options multiplying.
However, pluralism can bring some coherence back into this debate, as plu-
ralist intuitions underpin all of this recent work. Consequently, focus on
pluralism reveals not a disparate mess of views but rather reveals that a
new movement in decision theory has developed in recent years and that it
is gaining pace.
In light of all of the above, I conclude: by ignoring pluralism, we’re doing
rational choice theory wrong; we’re doing rational choice theory wrong and
to do it right we need to take seriously both the causal and the evidential
perspectives. This paper, then, is a call to the decision-theoretic barricades
and on our uniforms engraved these words: “decision theory”, and below,
“plurality, indeterminacy, contextuality”.
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